About 26 USC § 83

26 USC § 83 - All property is an "amount paid":

1.
Tax Code § 83 applies to any and all compensation for personal services actually performed: YouTube - https://youtu.be/YWZ10bpVmp0

Pledger v. C.I.R., 641 F.2d 287, 293 (CA5 1981): "The taxing scheme imposed by Congress more accurately reflects what taxpayer received as compensation than a scheme that taxes the taxpayer on merely a portion of the compensation."

Alves v. C.I.R., 734 F.2d 478, 481 (CA9 1984): "The plain language of section 83(a) belies Alve's argument. Section 83(a) applies to all property transferred in connection with the performance of services. No reference is made to the term "compensation." Nor is there any statutory requirement that property have a fair market value in excess of the amount paid at the time of transfer. Indeed, if Congress had intended section 83(a) to apply solely to restricted stock used to compensate its employees, it could have used much narrower language. Indeed, Congress made section 83(a) applicable to all restricted "property," not just stock; to property transferred to "any person," not just to employees; and to property transferred "in connection with . . . services," not just compensation for employment. See Cohn v. Commissioner, 73 USTC 443, 446-47 (1979)."

Robinson v. C.I.R., 82 USTC 444, 459 (1984): "The legislative history of section 83 does not require the conclusion that the statute should be applied to tax-avoidance techniques only. To the contrary, the House and Senate reports specifically delineate transactions and transfers to which section 83 was not to apply and do not exclude from its purview contractual provisions that were not tax motivated."

Pagel, Inc. v. Commissioner, 91 TC 200, 204-05 (Tax Court #34122-85, 1988): "We shall begin our analysis with an exegesis of the general provisions of section 83. We then shall examine those provisions in conjunction with the facts of the instant case so that we may decide whether respondent adequately notified petitioner of the issue of the applicability of section 83. Section 83(a) generally provides that where property is transferred in connection with the performance of past, present, or future services, the excess of the fair market 205*205 value of the property over the amount paid for the property is includable as compensation in the gross income of the taxpayer who performed the services. Bagley v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 663, 669 (1985), affd. per curiam 806 F.2d 169 (8th Cir. 1986). Section 83 does not apply only to employees of the transferor of the property; rather, it is applicable to any person other than the one for whom the services were performed, including independent contractors of the transferor. Cohn v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 443, 446 (1979). (footnote ommited). Thus, even though petitioner's relationship to Immuno was that of an independent contractor rather than an employee, section 83 may apply to the receipt or disposition of the warrant by petitioner if the other requirements of that section are met."

MacNaughton v. C.I.R., 888 F.2d 418, 421 (CA6 1989): "The Alves court stated that the plain language of section 83 belied this argument because the "statute applied to all property transferred in connection with the performance of services" and because no reference is made to the term "compensation." Id. The court further concluded in Alves that "if Congress had intended section 83(a) to apply solely to restricted stock used to compensate employees, it could have used much narrower language." Id. at 481-82. Upon consideration, we agree with the interpretation advanced by the Alves court and, therefore, join the Ninth Circuit in holding that section 83 is not limited to stock transfers which are compensatory in nature."

*Concurring with Cohn, Alves, see Centel Communications Co. v. CIR, 920 F.2d 1335, 1342 (CA7 1990).

Klingler Electric Co. v. C.I.R., 776 F.Supp. 1158, 1164 at [1] (S.D.Miss. 1991): "Section 83(a) applies to all property transferred in connection with the performance of services."

Montelepre Systemed, Inc. v. C.I.R., 956 F.2d 496, 498 at [1] (CA5 1992): "Section 83(a) explains how property received in exchange for services is taxed."

Gudmundsson v. US, 634 F.3d 212 (CA2 2011): "At the heart of this case is I.R.C. § 83, which governs the taxation of property transferred in connection with the performance of services."

"Section 83 provides for the determination of the amount to be included in gross income and the timing of the inclusion when property is transferred to an employee or independent contractor in connection with the performance of services." (See IRS Revenue Ruling 2007-19, IRS' Office of Associate Chief Counsel (Procedure & Administration), Administrative Provisions and Judicial Practice Division, 2007)."

IRS Officer, Sue Besson, 20 yrs. on the job who performed over 500 investigations, on the stand in the tax evasion trial of Raymond Gebauer, August of 2007: "I am unfamiliar with § 83."

The Supreme Court says:

"[W]e have referred to the Court of Appeals when enquiring whether a right was "clearly established." "

See United States v. Lanier, 520 US 259, 269, 137 L.Ed.2d 432, 117 S.Ct. 1219 (1997) (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 427 US 511, 533, 86 L.Ed.2d 411, 105 S.Ct. 2806 (1985); Davis v. Scherer, 468 US 183, 191-92, 82 L.Ed.2d. 139, 104 S.Ct. 3012 (1984); Elder v. Halloway, 510 US 510, 516, 127 L.Ed.2d 344, 114 S.Ct. 1019 (1994) (treating Court of Appeals decisions as "relevant authority" that must be considered as part of qualified immunity enquiry)).

"[E]ach section of the Internal Revenue Code is not a self contained whole, but rather a building block of a complex, interrelated statute." (See Hartman v. Comm'r IRS, 65 TC 542, 545 (1975)).

          Because § 83 is universally applicable to any and all compensation, I have no choice but to comply with it when I calculate my income tax liability. More importantly, the IRS has the same obligation.

******************************

Authorities relative to the interpretation of Tax Code § 83(a):

2.
Labor is property, and its value is determined through the terms of an arm's length transaction:

Labor is the most sacred property and inviolable right of man.

See Butcher's Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., 111 U.S. 746 (1883). And -

"Fair market value is that "price which would probably agreed upon by a seller willing, but under no compulsion, to sell, and a buyer willing, but under no compulsion, to buy, where both have reasonable knowledge of the facts."

          Black's Law Dictionary, 6th Edition, "Arm's length transaction." Said of a transaction negotiated between unrelated parties, each acting in his or her own self interest; the basis for a fair market value determination. A transaction in good faith in the ordinary course of business by parties with independent interests . . . The standard under which unrelated parties, each acting in his or her own best interest, would carry out a particular transaction.

          From my employer, from my customer, from my client, who are unrelated parties who pay me in arm's length transactions for my personal services, I receive fees, commissions, tips, salaries, vacation pay, sick pay, medical benefits, dental benefits, company car, a pension, all things paid in connection with the performance of my services under the contract governing my obligations to the one purchasing my services.

******************************

3.
When the law says "any" or "any property" it's construed as all inclusive:

          As used in statute and regulation, the terms "any" or "any property" are to be construed as all inclusive until express statutory exceptions can be cited to support a contention that such terms are not all inclusive. (See U.S. v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600, 607-611 and (syllabus) (1989); United States v. Alvarez-Sanchez, 511 U.S. 350, 357 (1994); U.S. v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 4-6 (1997); Department of Housing and Urban Renewal v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 130-31 (2002) citing Gonzalez and Monsanto (ALL FOUR decisions in .pdf format here)).

1994 - Alvarez: U.S. argues successfully that, because statute expressly provides for an exception to "any," that it is not all inclusive, that a "delay" should not preclude a criminal defendant's confession or statement to state police from being used as evidence in federal case commenced thereafter. DOJ can use confession sought to be suppressed by criminal defendant.

1997 - Gonzales: U.S. argues successfully that "any" in sentencing laws is all inclusive and therefore prevents the defendants from serving federal time concurrently with other sentences, argues for more jail time and gets it. More jail time for convict.

2002 - Rucker (citing Monsanto and Gonzales): U.S. argues successfully that "innocent owner" defense unavailable to co-tenant of low income housing who, although innocent, was subject to the statute's eviction of an all inclusive "any tenant" of a leased unit where prohibited activity had taken place. U.S. can evict the innocent tenant of low income housing unit which is scene of prohibited behavior.

2008 - See Ali v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 128 S. Ct. 831, 835-36 (2008): "Petitioner's argument is inconsistent with the statute's language.(fn.3 omitted) The phrase "any other law enforcement officer" suggests a broad meaning. Ibid. (emphasis added). We have previously noted that "[r]ead naturally, the word `any' has [836] an expansive meaning, that is, `one or some indiscriminately of whatever kind.'" United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 5, 117 S.Ct. 1032, 137 L.Ed.2d 132 (1997) (quoting Webster's Third New International Dictionary 97 (1976)). In Gonzales, we considered a provision that imposed an additional sentence for firearms used in federal drug trafficking crimes and provided that such additional sentence shall not be concurrent with "any other term of imprisonment." 520 U.S., at 4, 117 S.Ct. 1032 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (1994 ed.) (emphasis deleted)). Notwithstanding the subsection's initial reference to federal drug trafficking crimes, we held that the expansive word "any" and the absence of restrictive language left "no basis in the text for limiting" the phrase "any other term of imprisonment" to federal sentences. 520 U.S., at 5, 117 S.Ct. 1032. Similarly, in Harrison v. PPG Industries, Inc., 446 U.S. 578, 100 S.Ct. 1889, 64 L.Ed.2d 525 (1980), the Court considered the phrase "any other final action" in amendments to the Clean Air Act. The Court explained that the amendments expanded a list of Environmental Protection Agency Administrator actions by adding two categories of actions: actions under a specifically enumerated statutory provision, and "any other final action" under the Clean Air Act. Id., at 584, 100 S.Ct. 1889 (emphasis deleted). Focusing on Congress' choice of the word "any," the Court "discern[ed] no uncertainty in the meaning of the phrase, `any other final action,'" and emphasized that the statute's "expansive language offer[ed] no indication whatever that Congress intended" to limit the phrase to final actions similar to those in the specifically enumerated sections. Id., at 588-589, 100 S.Ct. 1889."

And from Monsanto, Id.:

"Section 853's language is plain and unambiguous. Congress could not have chosen stronger words to express its intent that forfeiture be mandatory than § 853(a)'s language that upon conviction a person "shall forfeit . . . any property" and that the sentencing court "shall order" a forfeiture. Likewise, the statute provides a broad definition of property which does not even hint at the idea that assets used for attorney's fees are not included. Every Court of Appeals that has finally passed on this argument has agreed with this view. Neither the Act's legislative history nor legislators' post-enactment statements support respondent's argument that an exception should be created because the statute does not expressly include property to be used for attorney's fees, or because Congress simply did not consider the prospect that forfeiture would reach such property. . . . Moreover, respondent's admonition that courts should construe statutes to avoid decision as to their constitutionality is not license for the judiciary to rewrite statutory language. Pp. 606-611."

"In determining the scope of a statute, we look first to its language." United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580 (1981). In the case before us, the language of § 853 is plain and unambiguous: all assets falling within its scope are to be forfeited upon conviction, with no exception existing for the assets used to pay attorney's fees -- or anything else, for that matter.

          As observed above, § 853(a) provides that a person convicted of the offenses charged in respondent's indictment "shall forfeit . . . any property" that was derived from the commission of these offenses. After setting out this rule, § 853(a) repeats later in its text that upon conviction a sentencing court "shall order" forfeiture of all property described in § 853(a). Congress could not have chosen stronger words to express its intent that forfeiture be mandatory in cases where the statute applied, or broader words to define the scope of what was to be forfeited. Likewise, the statute provides a broad definition of "property" when describing what types of assets are within the section's scope: "real property . . . tangible and intangible personal property, including rights, privileges, interests, claims, and securities." 21 U.S.C. § 853(b) (1982 ed., Supp.V). Nothing in this all-inclusive listing even hints at the idea that assets to be used to pay an attorney are not "property" within the statute's meaning.
          Nor are we alone in concluding that the statute is unambiguous in failing to exclude assets that could be used to pay an attorney from its definition of forfeitable property. This argument, advanced by respondent here, see Brief for Respondent 12-19, has been unanimously rejected by every Court of Appeals that has finally passed on it, as it was by the Second Circuit panel below, see 836 F.2d at 78-80; id. at 85-86 (Oakes, J., dissenting); even the judges who concurred on statutory grounds in the en banc decision did not accept this position, see 852 F.2d at 1405-1410 (Winter, J., concurring). We note also that the Brief for American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae 6, frankly admits that the statute "on [its] face, broadly cover[s] all property derived from alleged criminal activity and contain[s] no specific exemption for property used to pay bona fide attorneys' fees."
          Respondent urges us, nonetheless, to interpret the statute to exclude such property for several reasons. Principally, respondent contends that we should create such an exemption because the statute does not expressly include property to be used for attorneys' fees . . . In support, respondent observes that the legislative history is "silent" on this question, and that the House and Senate debates fail to discuss this prospect. But this proves nothing[.] The fact that the forfeiture provision reaches assets that could be used to pay attorney's fees, even though it contains no express provisions to this effect, "'does not demonstrate ambiguity'" in the statute: "'It demonstrates breadth.'" Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 499 (1985) (quoting Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 747 F.2d 384, 398 (CA7 1984)). The statutory provision at issue here is broad and unambiguous, and Congress' failure to supplement § 853(a)'s comprehensive phrase -- "any property" -- with an exclamatory "and we even mean assets to be used to pay an attorney" does not lessen the force of the statute's plain language."

"As we have noted before, such post-enactment views "form a hazardous basis for inferring the intent" behind a statute, United States v. Price, 361 U.S. 304, 313 (1960); instead, Congress' intent is "best determined by [looking to] the statutory language that it chooses," Sedima, S.P.R.L., supra, at 495, n.13. . . . Finally, respondent urges us, see Brief for Respondent 2029, to invoke a variety of general canons of statutory construction, as well as several prudential doctrines of this Court, to create the statutory exemption he advances; among these doctrines is our admonition that courts should construe statutes to avoid decision as to their constitutionality. See, e.g., Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Building & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988); NLRB. v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 500 (1979). We respect these canons, and they are quite often useful in close cases, or when statutory language is ambiguous. But we have observed before that such "interpretative canon[s are] not a license for the judiciary to rewrite language enacted by the legislature." United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 680 (1985). Here, the language is clear and the statute comprehensive: § 853 does not exempt assets to be used for attorney's fees from its forfeiture provisions."

          The Supreme Court's rulings are good enough for me when they're based on all relevant evidence. Even more important for the purposes of § 83 is the fact that the government won these four cases arguing that the term "any" means everything unless the law expressly provides otherwise.

See Rubio v. Lynch, US Attorney General, #14-60183 (CA5 May 21, 2015). And -

See United States v. Porter, 745 F.3d 1035 (CA10 March 6, 2014). And -

See United States v. Jungers, 702 F.3d 1066, 1070 (CA8 January 7, 2013). And -

See United States v. Neal, #12-10454 (CA9 January 12, 2015).

http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2015/01/12/12-10454.pdf

          It's univeral - the term "any" means everything, any property means all property, any person means any person, unless the law provides for an exception or exclusion of some from the term to which "any" is to apply.

******************************

4.
What is your interpretation of Tax Code § 83(a)?

26 USC § 83 Property Transferred in Connection with the Performance of Services. If, in connection with the performance of services property is transferred, . . . the excess of . . . the fair market value of such property . . . over . . . the amount (if any) paid for such property, . . . shall be included in the gross income of the person who performed such services . . .

26 CFR 1.83-3(g) Amount paid. For purposes of section 83 and the regulations thereunder, the term "amount paid" refers to the value of any money or property paid for the transfer of property to which § 83 applies.

*End authorities.

******************************

5.
Conclusion:
          It doesn't get any easier than this - one statute, one regulation, and all the case law in the world in support. You won't find a single accountant or tax attorney who knows anything about § 83 and its relevance and importance. The only reason for they're ignorance has to be that they never bothered to read the Tax Code, for if they had they surely would have come across § 83. Can anyone rightfully claim to be a tax expert when they haven't even read the Tax Code? No. What business does anyone have suggesting that the Tax Code should be rewritten or simplified if they aren't even aware of the statute that "explains how" to tax compensation? What if, like the PPACA, the Tax Code is complex for the purposes of hiding the true nature of the law?
         "It is settled that when the law is vague or highly debatable, a defendant -- actually or imputedly -- lacks the requisite intent to violate it." (See US v. Critzer, 498 F.2d 1160, 1162 (CA4 1974). Accord, citing Critzer, see US v. Mallas, 762 F.2d 361 fn.4 (CA4 1985); US v. Cole, 631 F.3d 146, 151 (CA4 2011); US v. Danielczyk, 788 F.Supp.2d 472, 490 (E.D. Va. 2011); US v. Goland, 959 F.2d 1449, 1456 (dissent) (CA9 1992); US v. Clardy, 612 F.2d 1139, 1152 (CA9 1980); US v. Pirro, 212 F.3d 86, 91 (CA2 2000); US v. Garber, 607 F.2d 92, 98 (CA5 1979); US v. Heller, 830 F.2d 150, 154 (CA11 1987); US v. Schmidt, 935 F.2d 1440, 1448 (CA4 1991); US v. Diamond, 788 F.2d 1025, 1028 (CA4 1986); US v. Billie, 667 F.Supp. 1485, 1493 (USDC S.D. Florida 1987); US v. Lewis, 730 F.Supp. 691, 693 (USDC W.D. North Carolina 1990); US v. General Dynamics Corp., 644 F.Supp. 1497, 1500-01 (USDC C.D. Calif. 1986); US v. DeCastris, 798 F.2d 261, 267 (dissent) (CA7 1986); US v. Lewis, 649 F.Supp. 1109, 1111 (USDC W.D. Mich. 1986); US v. Baer, 662 F.Supp. 126, 130 (USDC W.D. New York 1987); US v. Masters, 730 F.Supp. 686, 690 (citing US v. Mallas, 762 F.2d 361 fn.4 (CA4 1985)) (USDC W.D. Charlotte Division, North Carolina 1990); US v. D'Alessio, 822 F.Supp. 1134, 1144 (USDC New Jersey 1993); Richmond Medical Center for Women v. Gilmore, 55 F.Supp.2d 441, 499 (USDC E.D. Richmond, Virginia 1999); US v. Dahlstrom, 713 F.2d 1423, 1428 (CA9 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 980, 104 S.Ct. 2363, 80 L.Ed.2d 835 (1984)).
          I can't get the government to place onto the record its own interpretation of § 83(a), no matter how antagonistic and confrontational I can get away with being in pleadings in federal tax cases. If you have an interpretation of § 83(a) that differs from my conclusion that it treats all property, including labor or personal services, as a cost, you're a better tax lawyer than all those at the IRS and the DOJ, and all IRS employees who are "unfamiliar with § 83."
          What are the ramifications if the federal government is indeed depriving you and all Americans of the provisions of § 83 to steal the amounts it calls an income tax on the value of your personal services? Doesn't this in fact make a felon of every official, agent, and employee of the federal government who's involved in the enforcement of the Tax Code? Isn't it true that the law from coast to coast allows any person with knowledge or reasonable suspicion that a felony has been committed to arrest the felon and take them to the authorities? Yes. Would you like a compilation of citizen's arrest cases in federal courts from across America? Would you like a list of felony statutes the federal government violates through this misenforcement of the Tax Code? How did § 83(a) operate in the conclusion that you have gross income to report and to pay an income tax on when all you received was the fair market value of your personal services? Is what the IRS demands actually a "tax," or is it extortion and racketeering?
          ADD TO THIS the fact that Social Security is an income tax, and that § 83(a) applies to all compensation, which includes FICA wages and salaries in § 3121(a) (in Ch.21), and self employment earnings in Ch.2, which means that Social Security has never applied to the fair market value of personal services, AND it has never applied to Americans.
          ALSO, § 83(a) applies to the salaries and wages paid to IRS employees, to all public servants. How did § 83(a) operate last year when they filed tax returns? That's a good question.
          Every dime, every year, for decades on end, nothing but extortion and racketeering; Americans have never owed the IRS anything.

Watch as the gov't skips over 83:

See US v. Melton, #94-5535 (CA4 May 22, 1996 Unpublished) (USDC #CR-93-34 W.D. North Carolina at Shelby).

ABOVE - NO REFERENCE TO § 83!

Is US Tax Court relevant?

_______________________________________________

Property of:
          American Liberties, LLC -
          *All rights reserved, no unauthorized reproduction allowed.

"What's the big deal? Been there, done that."
David R. Myrland

...