As used in statute and regulation, the terms "any" or "any property" are to be construed as all inclusive until express statutory exceptions can be cited to support a contention that such terms are not all inclusive. (See U.S. v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600, 607-611 and (syllabus) (1989); United States v. Alvarez-Sanchez, 511 U.S. 350, 357 (1994); U.S. v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 4-6 (1997); Department of Housing and Urban Renewal v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 130-31 (2002) citing Gonzalez and Monsanto).
1989 - Monsanto: Heroin manufacturer Monsanto argues that he should be allowed to keep enough money for attorney's fees, but the DOJ argues successfully that "any property" is all inclusive and therefore means the U.S. can seize any and all property unless Monsanto can point to a specific exclusion of attorney's fees under the law. DOJ can seize everything owned by defendant.
1994 - Alvarez: U.S. argues successfully that, because statute expressly provides for an exception to "any," that it is not all inclusive, that a "delay" should not preclude a criminal defendant's confession or statement to state police from being used as evidence in federal case commenced thereafter. DOJ can use confession sought to be suppressed by criminal defendant.
1997 - Gonzales: U.S. argues successfully that "any" in sentencing laws is all inclusive and therefore prevents the defendants from serving federal time concurrently with other sentences, argues for more jail time and gets it. More jail time for convict.
2002 - Rucker (citing Monsanto and Gonzales): U.S. argues successfully that "innocent owner" defense unavailable to co-tenant of low income housing who, although innocent, was subject to the statute's eviction of an all inclusive "any tenant" of a leased unit where prohibited activity had taken place. U.S. can evict the innocent tenant of low income housing unit which is scene of prohibited behavior.
2008 - See Ali v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 128 S. Ct. 831, 835-36 (2008): "Petitioner's argument is inconsistent with the statute's language.(fn.3 omitted) The phrase "any other law enforcement officer" suggests a broad meaning. Ibid. (emphasis added). We have previously noted that "[r]ead naturally, the word `any' has  an expansive meaning, that is, `one or some indiscriminately of whatever kind.'" United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 5, 117 S.Ct. 1032, 137 L.Ed.2d 132 (1997) (quoting Webster's Third New International Dictionary 97 (1976)). In Gonzales, we considered a provision that imposed an additional sentence for firearms used in federal drug trafficking crimes and provided that such additional sentence shall not be concurrent with "any other term of imprisonment." 520 U.S., at 4, 117 S.Ct. 1032 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (1994 ed.) (emphasis deleted)). Notwithstanding the subsection's initial reference to federal drug trafficking crimes, we held that the expansive word "any" and the absence of restrictive language left "no basis in the text for limiting" the phrase "any other term of imprisonment" to federal sentences. 520 U.S., at 5, 117 S.Ct. 1032. Similarly, in Harrison v. PPG Industries, Inc., 446 U.S. 578, 100 S.Ct. 1889, 64 L.Ed.2d 525 (1980), the Court considered the phrase "any other final action" in amendments to the Clean Air Act. The Court explained that the amendments expanded a list of Environmental Protection Agency Administrator actions by adding two categories of actions: actions under a specifically enumerated statutory provision, and "any other final action" under the Clean Air Act. Id., at 584, 100 S.Ct. 1889 (emphasis deleted). Focusing on Congress' choice of the word "any," the Court "discern[ed] no uncertainty in the meaning of the phrase, `any other final action,'" and emphasized that the statute's "expansive language offer[ed] no indication whatever that Congress intended" to limit the phrase to final actions similar to those in the specifically enumerated sections. Id., at 588-589, 100 S.Ct. 1889."
And from Monsanto, Id.:
"Section 853's language is plain and unambiguous. Congress could not have chosen stronger words to express its intent that forfeiture be mandatory than § 853(a)'s language that upon conviction a person "shall forfeit . . . any property" and that the sentencing court "shall order" a forfeiture. Likewise, the statute provides a broad definition of property which does not even hint at the idea that assets used for attorney's fees are not included. Every Court of Appeals that has finally passed on this argument has agreed with this view. Neither the Act's legislative history nor legislators' post-enactment statements support respondent's argument that an exception should be created because the statute does not expressly include property to be used for attorney's fees, or because Congress simply did not consider the prospect that forfeiture would reach such property. . . . Moreover, respondent's admonition that courts should construe statutes to avoid decision as to their constitutionality is not license for the judiciary to rewrite statutory language. Pp. 606-611."
"In determining the scope of a statute, we look first to its language." United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580 (1981). In the case before us, the language of § 853 is plain and unambiguous: all assets falling within its scope are to be forfeited upon conviction, with no exception existing for the assets used to pay attorney's fees -- or anything else, for that matter.
As observed above, § 853(a) provides that a person convicted of the offenses charged in respondent's indictment "shall forfeit . . . any property" that was derived from the commission of these offenses. After setting out this rule, § 853(a) repeats later in its text that upon conviction a sentencing court "shall order" forfeiture of all property described in § 853(a). Congress could not have chosen stronger words to express its intent that forfeiture be mandatory in cases where the statute applied, or broader words to define the scope of what was to be forfeited. Likewise, the statute provides a broad definition of "property" when describing what types of assets are within the section's scope: "real property . . . tangible and intangible personal property, including rights, privileges, interests, claims, and securities." 21 U.S.C. § 853(b) (1982 ed., Supp.V). Nothing in this all-inclusive listing even hints at the idea that assets to be used to pay an attorney are not "property" within the statute's meaning.
Nor are we alone in concluding that the statute is unambiguous in failing to exclude assets that could be used to pay an attorney from its definition of forfeitable property. This argument, advanced by respondent here, see Brief for Respondent 12-19, has been unanimously rejected by every Court of Appeals that has finally passed on it, as it was by the Second Circuit panel below, see 836 F.2d at 78-80; id. at 85-86 (Oakes, J., dissenting); even the judges who concurred on statutory grounds in the en banc decision did not accept this position, see 852 F.2d at 1405-1410 (Winter, J., concurring). We note also that the Brief for American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae 6, frankly admits that the statute "on [its] face, broadly cover[s] all property derived from alleged criminal activity and contain[s] no specific exemption for property used to pay bona fide attorneys' fees."
Respondent urges us, nonetheless, to interpret the statute to exclude such property for several reasons. Principally, respondent contends that we should create such an exemption because the statute does not expressly include property to be used for attorneys' fees . . . In support, respondent observes that the legislative history is "silent" on this question, and that the House and Senate debates fail to discuss this prospect. But this proves nothing[.] The fact that the forfeiture provision reaches assets that could be used to pay attorney's fees, even though it contains no express provisions to this effect, "'does not demonstrate ambiguity'" in the statute: "'It demonstrates breadth.'" Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 499 (1985) (quoting Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 747 F.2d 384, 398 (CA7 1984)). The statutory provision at issue here is broad and unambiguous, and Congress' failure to supplement § 853(a)'s comprehensive phrase -- "any property" -- with an exclamatory "and we even mean assets to be used to pay an attorney" does not lessen the force of the statute's plain language."
"As we have noted before, such post-enactment views "form a hazardous basis for inferring the intent" behind a statute, United States v. Price, 361 U.S. 304, 313 (1960); instead, Congress' intent is "best determined by [looking to] the statutory language that it chooses," Sedima, S.P.R.L., supra, at 495, n.13. . . . Finally, respondent urges us, see Brief for Respondent 2029, to invoke a variety of general canons of statutory construction, as well as several prudential doctrines of this Court, to create the statutory exemption he advances; among these doctrines is our admonition that courts should construe statutes to avoid decision as to their constitutionality. See, e.g., Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Building & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988); NLRB. v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 500 (1979). We respect these canons, and they are quite often useful in close cases, or when statutory language is ambiguous. But we have observed before that such "interpretative canon[s are] not a license for the judiciary to rewrite language enacted by the legislature." United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 680 (1985). Here, the language is clear and the statute comprehensive: § 853 does not exempt assets to be used for attorney's fees from its forfeiture provisions."
UP TO DATE - The US government has won in the U.S. Supreme Court on four occasions arguing that the statutory terms "any" and "any property" are all inclusive unless the law provides for an exclusion of something from the item or class of thing, property, or matter to which said term(s) applies. (See U.S. v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600, 607-611 and (syllabus) (1989); United States v. Alvarez-Sanchez, 511 U.S. 350, 357 (1994); U.S. v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 4-6 (1997); Department of Housing and Urban Renewal v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 130-31 (2002) citing Gonzalez and Monsanto). The IRS' exclusion of the value of personal services from "the value of any money or property paid," and from "cash or other property," is arbitrary, a fortiori, it is impermissible. The Talmage court cited no such exception provided by law. This interpretation of "any" is universal. See decisions citing Gonzales, id. "any" is expansive and all inclusive: Ali v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 552 U.S. 214, 228, 128 S.Ct. 831, 835-36 (2008); Ashland Hospital Corp. v. RLI Ins. Co., Civil #13-143-DLB-EBA (E.D. Kentucky, Northern Division, Ashland, March 17, 2015); Electronic Privacy Center v. U.S. Dept. of Homeland Security, 777 F.3d 518, 525 (CA Dist. Columbia February 10, 2015); Florida Health Sciences Center v. Sec. of U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Svcs., Civil #14-0791 (ABJ) (USDC of D.C. March 31, 2015); Florez v. Holder, U.S. Attorney General, Civil #14-874 (CA2 March 4, 2015); United States v. Kaluza, #14-30122 (CA5 March 11, 2015); United States v. Shill, 740 F.3d 1347, 1352 (CA9 January 14, 2014); United States v. Weisinger, #13-3655-cr (CA2 October 6, 2014); Arcia v. Florida Sec. of State, 746 F.3d 1273, 1281 (CA11 April 1, 2014); In re Bernard Madoff Investment Securities, LLC v. IDA Fishman Revocable Trust, #12-2557-bk(L) (CA2 December 8, 2014); Natural Resources Defense Council v. Environmental Protection Agency, 755 F.3d 1010, 1019 (CA D.C. June 27, 2014); WNET, et al. v. Aero, Inc., et al., 722 F.3d 500, 510 (CA2 July 16, 2013); PBBPC, Inc. v. OPK Biotech, LLC, 484 B.R. 860, 868 (Jan 17, 2013); Harkness v. United States, 727 F.3d 465, 471 (CA6 July 11,2013).
"The determinative issue is therefore whether the phrase "any status" imposes an additional requirement that an alien must satisfy in addition to being admitted to the United States. We find no basis for so concluding. Although the word "status" is not defined in the INA, its general meaning is "[a] person's legal condition." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1542 (10th ed. 2014); see also MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1220 (11th ed. 2007) (defining "status" as "the condition of a person or thing in the eyes of the law"). In conjunction, it is well settled that "the word `any' has an expansive meaning, that is, one or some indiscriminately of whatever kind." Ali v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 552 U.S. 214, 219 (2008) (quoting United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 5 (1997)); see also HUD v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 131 (2002); United States v. Clayton, 613 F.3d 592, 596 (5th Cir. 2010); MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 56 (11th ed. 2007). The use of the word "any" to modify a term "suggests a broad meaning." Ali, 552 U.S. at 218-19; see also Clayton, 613 F.3d at 596 ("The CCPA uses the modifier `any' in describing the tax debts to which it applies, a term we must construe as `broad' and `ha[ving] an expansive meaning.'" (quoting Ali, 552 U.S. at 219)). The Supreme Court has therefore explained that where, as here, Congress "did not add any language limiting the breadth of [the] word," any "must" be read "as referring to all" of the type to which it refers. Gonzales, 520 U.S. at 5; see also Merritt v. Dillard Paper Co., 120 F.3d 1181, 1186 (11th Cir. 1997). In other words, far from being further limiting, the word "any" is expansive."
See Rubio v. Lynch, US Attorney General, #14-60183 (CA5 May 21, 2015). And -
"Specifically, Blixt tacitly relied on the so-called "general-terms canon" that holds that "[g]eneral terms are to be given their general meaning." Scalia & Garner, supra, at 101 (boldface omitted). We agree with Blixt that, when Congress used the general term "any" to modify the term "name," it meant to give that term an "expansive" meaning. Blixt, 548 F.3d at 887; see, e.g., Nat'l Credit Union Admin. Bd. v. Nomura Home Equity Loan, Inc., 727 F.3d 1246, 1267 (10th Cir.2013) ("Read naturally, the word `any' has an expansive meaning...." (quoting Ali v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 552 U.S. 214, 219, 128 S.Ct. 831, 169 L.Ed.2d 680 (2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted)), pet. for cert. filed, 82 U.S.L.W. 3307 (U.S. Nov. 8, 2013) (13-576);United States v. S. Half of Lot 7 & 8, Block 14, Kountze's 3rd Addition to the City of Omaha, 910 F.2d 488, 489 (8th Cir.1990) (en banc) ("Congress's use of the word `any' to describe property `undercuts a narrow[er] construction.'" (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. James, 478 U.S. 597, 605, 106 S.Ct. 3116, 92 L.Ed.2d 483 (1986)))."
See United States v. Porter, 745 F.3d 1035 (CA10 March 6, 2014). And -
"The terms "whoever" and "any" are expansive. See, e.g., Freeman v. Quicken Loans, Inc., 566 U.S. ___, ___, 132 S.Ct. 2034, 2042, 182 L.Ed.2d 955 (2012) (explaining the term "any" "has an `expansive meaning,'" that "can broaden to the maximum, but never change in the least, the clear meaning of the phrase selected by Congress") (quoting Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 131, 122 S.Ct. 1230, 152 L.Ed.2d 258 (2002)); United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 5, 117 S.Ct. 1032, 137 L.Ed.2d 132 (1997) ("Read naturally, the word `any' has an expansive meaning, that is, `one or some indiscriminately of whatever kind.'") (quoting Webster's Third New International Dictionary 97 (1976)); United States v. Lucien,347 F.3d 45, 51 (2d Cir.2003) (rejecting a defendant's proposed construction of a statute that limited punishment for healthcare fraud to healthcare professionals because the statute applied to "whoever" committed such fraud and the common meaning of "whoever" was "whatever person, any person at all, no matter who") (quoting Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2611 (1981)) (internal quotation marks omitted); United States v. Khatib, 706 F.2d 213, 218 (7th Cir.1983) (rejecting a defendant's proposed status limitation on the term "whoever" in 7 U.S.C. § 2024(b)(1) because the statutory language was not restrictive)."
See United States v. Jungers, 702 F.3d 1066, 1070 (CA8 January 7, 2013). And -
"The statute's surrounding text also assists in interpreting the meaning of "real and personal property" as used in § 1521. The statute's repetition of the indefinite determiner "any" signals an intended broad and expansive application of the statute. See United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 5 (1997) (noting the word "any" has expansive meaning, "one or some indiscriminately of whatever kind"). In § 1521, the word "any" modifies where an individual is prohibited from filing-in any public record or in any private record (which is generally available to the public). See 18 U.S.C. § 1521. "Any" also modifies what is prohibited."
See United States v. Neal, #12-10454 (CA9 January 12, 2015).
It's univeral - the term "any" means everything, any property means all property, any person means any person, unless the law provides for an exception or exclusion of some from the term to which "any" is to apply.